Εμφάνιση αναρτήσεων με ετικέτα Αρθρογραφία. Εμφάνιση όλων των αναρτήσεων
Εμφάνιση αναρτήσεων με ετικέτα Αρθρογραφία. Εμφάνιση όλων των αναρτήσεων

Παρασκευή 11 Αυγούστου 2017


The IMF is not done destroying Greece yet



armstrongeconomics.com IMF-Logo

Zero Hedge — Austerity is over, proclaimed the IMF this week. And no doubt attributed that to the ‘successful’ period of ‘five years of belt tightening’ a.k.a. ‘gradual fiscal consolidation’ it has, along with its econo-religious ilk, imposed on many of the world’s people.
Only, it’s not true of course. Austerity is not over. You can ask many of those same people about that. It’s certainly not true in Greece.
IMF Says Austerity Is Over
 Austerity is over as governments across the rich world increased spending last year and plan to keep their wallets open for the foreseeable future. After five years of belt tightening, the IMF says the era of spending cuts that followed the financial crisis is now at an end. “Advanced economies eased their fiscal stance by one-fifth of 1pc of GDP in 2016, breaking a five-year trend of gradual fiscal consolidation,” said the IMF in its fiscal monitor.
In Greece, the government did not increase spending in 2016. Nor is the country’s era of spending cuts at an end. So did the IMF ‘forget’ about Greece? Or does it not count it as part of the rich world? Greece is a member of the EU, and the EU is absolutely part of the rich world, so that can’t be it.
However this may be, it’s obvious the IMF are not done with Greece yet. And neither are the rest of the Troika. They are still demanding measures that are dead certain to plunge the Greeks much further into their abyss in the future.
But sure enough, the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) jubilantly announced on Friday that the 2016 primary surplus was 4.19% (8 times more than the 0.5% expected). This is bad news for Greeks, though they don’t know it. It is also a condition for receiving the next phase of the current bailout. Here’s what that comes down to: in order to save itself from default/bankruptcy, the country is required to destroy its economy.
And that’s not all: the surplus is a requirement to get a next bailout tranche, and debt relief – but as a reward for achieving that surplus, Greece can now expect to get less debt relief. Because they managed to squeeze another €7.3 billion out of their poor. So they should always be able to do that in every subsequent year.
The government in Athens sees the surplus as a ‘weapon’ that can be used in the never-ending bailout negotiations, but the Troika will simply move the goalposts again; that’s its MO.
A country in a shape as bad as Greece’s needs stimulus, not a budget surplus; a deficit would be much more helpful. You could perhaps demand that the country goes for a 0% deficit, though even that is far from ideal. But never a surplus. Every penny of the surplus should have been spent to make sure the economy doesn’t get even worse.
The €7.369 billion primary surplus, in a country of somewhere between 10 and 11 million people, means some €700 per capita has been taken out of the economy in 2016. Money that could have been used to spend inside that economy, saving jobs, and keeping people fed and sheltered. For a family of 3.5 people that means €200 per month less to spend on necessities which is the only thing most Greeks can spend any money on.
The Troika is not “rebalancing Greece’s public finances in a growth-friendly manner”, as Dijsselbloem put it, it is strangling the economy. And then strangling it some more.
There may have been all sorts of things wrong in Greece, including financially. But that is true to some degree for every country.
And there’s no doubt there was, and still is, a lot of corruption. But that would seem to mean the EU must help fight that corruption, not suffocate the poor.

If you want to do that, taking 4% of GDP out of an economy, and 3.5% annually for years to come, it can only make things worse. And if the Greek economy deteriorates further, how can the country ever repay the debts it supposedly has? Isn’t that a lesson learned from the 1919 Versailles treaty?
The economists at the IMF and the EU/ECB, and the politicians they serve, either don’t understand basic economics, or they have their eyes on some other prize.


In 2012 Eurogroup agreed on a now forgotten deal for cutting Greek debt



German finance minister Sheauble / ekathimerini

The dispute between the IMF and Berlin goes back a few years. But when it comes to defending the German finance minister on the issue of Greek debt relief, it would appear that  a lot of what was agreed  the German finance minister and Athens has been abandoned or forgotten. That commitment for debt relief was made to different government that the Germans wanted to support  without really expecting Athens  to  ever meet the targets they demanded.   Now that their targets have been met, the agreement went out of the window. 
Below, an article from Reuters dated Tue Nov 27, 2012
The IMF  clinched an  agreement on reducing Greece’s debt on Monday [Nov 26 2012] in a breakthrough to release urgently needed loans to keep the near-bankrupt economy afloat.
After 12 hours of talks at their third meeting in as many weeks, Greece’s international lenders agreed on a package of measures to reduce Greek debt by 40 billion euros, cutting it to 124 percent of gross domestic product by 2020.
In a significant new pledge, ministers committed to taking further steps to lower Greece’s debt to “significantly below 110 percent” in 2022 — the most explicit recognition so far that some write-off of loans may be necessary from 2016, the pointwhen Greece is forecast to reach a primary budget surplus.
“When Greece has achieved, or is about to achieve, a primary surplus and fulfilled all of its conditions, we will, if need be, consider further measures for the reduction of the total debt,” German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said.
Eurogroup Chairman Jean-Claude Juncker said ministers would formally approve the release of a major aid installment.  Greece will receive up to 43.7 billion euros in stages as it fulfills the conditions. The December installment will comprise 23.8 billion for banks and 10.6 billion in budget assistance.
They also promised to hand back 11 billion euros in profits accruing to their national central banks from European Central Bank purchases of discounted Greek government bonds in the secondary market.
European Central Bank President Mario Draghi said on leaving the talks: “I very much welcome the decisions taken by the ministers of finance. They will certainly reduce the uncertainty and strengthen confidence in Europe and in Greece.”
The Greek Prime Minister at the time Antonis Samaras welcomed the deal.
“Everything went well,” he told reporters outside his mansion at about 3 a.m. in the morning.
“Tomorrow, a new day starts for all Greeks.”
However, the biggest opposition party, Syriza, dismissed the deal and said it fell short of what was needed to make the country’s debt sustainable.
A source familiar with IMF thinking said a loan write-off once Greece has fulfilled its adjustment program would be the simplest way to make its debt viable, but other methods such as forgoing interest payments, or lending at below market rates and extending maturities could all help.
German central bank governor Jens Weidmann has suggested that Greece could “earn” a reduction in debt it owes to euro zone governments in a few years if it diligently implements all the agreed reforms. The European Commission backs that view.
An opinion poll published on Monday [26 Nov 2012] showed the Syriza party with a four-percent lead over the Conservatives who won election in June, adding to uncertainty over the future of reforms.


Why the Yes campaign failed in Greece.
Wolfgang Munchau.    


The Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras votes in Athens Share on Twitter (opens new window) Share on Facebook (opens new window) Share on Whatsapp (opens new window) 250 Save JULY 6, 2015 by: Wolfgang Münchau It is not that hard to explain why Alexis Tsipras won the referendum by a landslide. It is a lot harder to see what’s going to happen now. His opponents, both inside Greece and in the European Union went wrong because of serial misjudgments, ranging from the petty to the monumental. For me, three stand out. The biggest was the clearly concerted intervention by several senior EU politicians, who said that a No vote would lead to Grexit, a Greek exit from the eurozone. One of them was Sigmar Gabriel, the German economics minister and SPD chief. He even doubled up on this threat right after the results came out. The Greeks correctly interpreted these threats as an attempt to interfere in the democratic process of their country. The news last week that eurozone officials tried to suppress the latest debt sustainability analysis of the International Monetary Fund did not help either. The IMF report essentially revealed that the Greek government had been right after all to demand debt relief. The rest of the EU gave the impression that it wanted to rig the referendum, and it did not even bother to conceal this. The second error of the Yes campaign was a failure to explain how the bailout programme could work economically. This is not a debate between Keynesian and neoclassical economics, the kind that keeps us endlessly busy on these pages. The Greek referendum united economists with very diverse views of how the world works, including Paul Krugman, Jeffrey Sachs and Hans-Werner Sinn. There is no reputable economic theory according to which an economy that has experienced an eight-year-long depression requires a new round of austerity to bring about economic adjustment. If you have been unemployed for five years, with no prospect of a job, it makes no difference whether the money you do not get is denominated in euros, or in drachma The third monumental error was arrogance. The Yes supporters thought they had it nailed. Like the British Labour party before the last general election, they had been relying on polls, which turned out to be wildly inaccurate. What I found most galling was the argument that Grexit would bring about an economic catastrophe, as though the catastrophe had not already happened. If you have been unemployed for five years, with no prospect of a job, it makes no difference whether the money you do not get is denominated in euros, or in drachma. Contempt for democracy and economic illiteracy are not merely tactical errors. Those two “qualities” are now the remaining ideological planks of what is left of the European project. Greece is a reminder that the European monetary union, as it is constructed, is fundamentally unsustainable. This means it will need to be fixed, or it will end at some point. So what are the options now? I will write about this in greater detail in my next column. But the bottom line is that it is going to be more difficult to achieve a deal now. After the No vote on Sunday, the Greek government will now insist on a very different deal with less austerity. It will insist, and be right to do so, on debt relief that is consistent with the IMF’s latest calculations. I find it hard to see a majority in Germany in favour of such a deal. In fact, I believe the only way to coerce Germany into debt relief talks is to start defaulting. This is not going to happen any other way. At that point, however, the possibility of a Grexit is large. Perhaps the most realistic solution now would be an agreement that only covers the refinancing of the Greek banking system. The Greek government defaults on its creditors, while the creditors stop paying Greece any new money. That would minimise everyone’s commitment, but such an arrangement, too, is fraught with difficulty. And finally, it is best not to think of Grexit as a choice the Greek government may, or may not, make. It is not a choice anyone will take. Grexit is what happens when all the other possibilities have been exhausted. There are not many left now.

Τρίτη 8 Αυγούστου 2017

Ν.Χριστοδουλακης : Όσοι ήθελαν το ΔΝΤ είχαν κρυφά σχέδια για Grexit ή πίστευαν ότι θα βγούμε από την κρίση σε έξι μήνες

Κυριακή 30 Ιουλίου 2017

Η ελληνική οικονομία σε επιτήρηση. Φως στην ιστορια απο τον Αλμουνια - 2009  ! (2)
Η ελληνική οικονομία σε επιτήρηση. Φως στην ιστορια απο τον Αλμουνια - 2009  ! (1)

http://www.kathimerini.gr/764419/article/epikairothta/politikh/2009-h-ellhnikh-oikonomia-se-epithrhsh

Τετάρτη 29 Ιουνίου 2011

Completing Economic and Monetary Union - Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB,

Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet,
at the Gala Dinner of the State of the European Union conference
“Revitalising the European Dream: A Corporate View”,
Brussels, 28 June 2011
Ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you for inviting me to this conference. The theme to which it is dedicated is especially relevant today, when we have to draw all the lessons from the worst financial crisis since World War II.

These days, “Europe” and the benefits it brings have come to be taken for granted. Thanks to the success of European integration, the threat of war has become a memory of the past for many Europeans, in particular the younger generation.

This makes it all the more urgent to develop a renewed vision of the kind of Europe we want and indeed need – a vision that is easily understood and shared amongst EU citizens.

Each generation needs to affirm its commitment to Europe.

As Pierre Werner once observed, “it is necessary that even those born well after the 1950s and 1960s realise that the European Union has not come about by chance, but that it is based on the fundamental necessities of life amongst the peoples of Europe” [1].

Thankfully, these “fundamental necessities of life” – especially in the economic sphere – still seem to be felt and understood by the people in Europe. When asked, in the Eurobarometer surveys, which issues the European institutions should focus on in the coming years, Europeans believe that priority should be given to economic and monetary policy (37% in the EU and 41% in the euro area).

Δευτέρα 27 Ιουνίου 2011

Πώς έφτασε η Ελλάδα στον «γκρεμό»...


Μελέτη - καταπέλτης του Harvard για την ανικανότητα όλων των κυβερνήσεων της μεταπολίτευσης στην οικονομική πολιτική
Του Λεωνιδα Στεργιου

Οι κρατικοποιήσεις εν μια νυκτί και η αύξηση των αμυντικών δαπανών του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή ακύρωσαν τα πλεονεκτήματα της αναπτυξιακής ώθησης και της ευρωπαϊκής προοπτικής που πέτυχε τότε η Ελλάδα. Ο λαϊκισμός του Ανδρέα Παπανδρέου κατέστρεψε τα οφέλη από την αναδιανομή του εισοδήματος και τη βελτίωση του βιoτικού επιπέδου, βάζοντας τα θεμέλια στον δημοσιονομικό εκτροχιασμό. Οι επόμενες κυβερνήσεις (Οικουμενική, Κ. Μητσοτάκη) προσπάθησαν να διαχειριστούν την κρίση, χωρίς επιτυχία. Εξαίρεση αποτέλεσαν οι κυβερνήσεις του Κ. Σημίτη, οι οποίες πέτυχαν νοικοκύρεμα των δημοσιονομικών, αλλά μπροστά στη βιασύνη για την ένταξη της χώρας στην ΟΝΕ, δεν έγιναν εκείνες οι δομικές μεταρρυθμίσεις που ήταν απαραίτητες. Η «Επανίδρυση του Κράτους» από τον Κώστα Καραμανλή περιορίστηκε στην «απογραφή». Η σημερινή κυβέρνηση θεώρησε σκόπιμο να ενημερώσει τις αγορές για τις ανεπάρκειες της Ελλάδας σε όλους τους τομείς και για τον δημοσιονομικό εκτροχιασμό, όμως, η ειλικρίνεια λειτούργησε ανάποδα και οι αγορές έβαλαν την Ελλάδα στη «μαύρη λίστα», εκτινάσσοντας τα spreads και τα CDS των ομολόγων.

Αυτή θα μπορούσε να ήταν η σύνοψη της 36σέλιδης μελέτης του Harvard με τίτλο «Ελληνική Κρίση: Τραγωδία ή Ευκαιρία;». Οι συγγραφείς, ο καθηγητής Dante Roscini και οι οικονομολόγοι JonathaSchlefer και Κωνσταντίνος Δημητρίου, προσπαθούν να απαντήσουν στο ερώτημα αυτό, αφού μελέτησαν την ιστορική διαδρομή της Ελλάδας από το... 324 μ.Χ.

Δείτε το αρθρο της Καθημερινής της 26-6-2011

Δείτε ολόκληρη τη μελέτη
A Financial Greek Tragedy and a European Farce: The crisis of the Eurozone in Historical Perspective

Κυριακή 19 Ιουνίου 2011

Greek debt crisis: PM proposes referendum on constitution

GuardianJune 19, 2011

The Greek prime minister, George Papandreou, has called for a referendum on "changes to the political system", including to the country's constitution, as he embarked on a three-day parliamentary marathon that will culminate in a confidence vote in his beleaguered government on Tuesday.

Papandreou blames Greece's bloated state sector for bringing the country to its knees and has vowed to effect deep changes. He said the constitutional revision would make it easier to prosecute delinquent government officials.

Papandreou also made a last-ditch plea to his country to pull together behind his latest package of austerity measures, which he says are essential to save Greece from bankruptcy. He said Greece was negotiating a new international bailout package that was "roughly equal" to last year's €110bn lifeline.

European eurozone ministers are meeting in Luxembourg on Sunday night to thrash out a new deal for Greece that officials hope will spare it from default and buy it breathing space to get its public finances in order. Greece's debt is currently more than €300bn – 150% of its annual economic output.
More

Ο πανικός δεν φτάνει...

του Παντελή Καψή

Το Βήμα
19 Ιουνίου 2011

Συναγερμός τέλος. Επειτα από δύο εφιαλτικά εικοσιτετράωρα στη διάρκεια των οποίων φλερτάραμε με την κατάρρευση - πολιτική και οικονομική - μπορούμε να αισιοδοξούμε ότι η κρίση πέρασε και μαζί απομακρύνθηκε και ο κίνδυνος μιας άμεσης χρεοκοπίας. Οφείλουμε όμως να πάρουμε τα μαθήματα που μας κληροδότησε.

Το πρώτο είναι ασφαλώς η εντυπωσιακή αστάθεια στο πολιτικό μας σύστημα το οποίο δείχνει να στηρίζεται σε ιδιαίτερα εύθραυστες ισορροπίες. Οι συνεχείς διαδηλώσεις διαμαρτυρίας των τελευταίων εβδομάδων, οι προπηλακισμοί πολιτικών, αλλά φυσικά και το κλίμα της απαξίωσης που κυριαρχεί ακόμη και σε κατεστημένα μέσα ενημέρωσης δοκιμάζουν τις αντοχές των πολιτικών. Σε μια περίοδο που οφείλουν να δείξουν αποφασιστικότητα και να εμπνεύσουν σιγουριά οι περισσότεροι μοιάζουν παρατημένοι και έτοιμοι να δραπετεύσουν.

Ενας λανθασμένος χειρισμός από τον Πρωθυπουργό για την οικουμενική - τραγικά λανθασμένος, είναι αλήθεια - αποδείχθηκε αρκετός για να πυροδοτήσει μια πολιτική κρίση που θα μπορούσε να έχει απρόβλεπτα αποτελέσματα. Το κλίμα συσπείρωσης που επικράτησε τελικώς στο ΠαΣοΚ και βέβαια η προαγωγή του Ευάγγελου Βενιζέλου άλλαξαν την εικόνα. Ολοι αναρωτιούνται όμως ως πότε.
Περισσότερα

Σάββατο 18 Ιουνίου 2011

Greek Crisis Eases for Now

WSJ - JUNE 18, 2011
By MARCUS WALKER in Berlin and ALKMAN GRANITSAS in Athens

After weeks of brinksmanship over Greece, Germany gave ground Friday, improving the chances that the struggling country will avoid a messy debt default this year that could threaten the stability of the euro currency area.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel dropped her government's insistence on forcing a rescheduling of Greek government bonds, ending a six-week standoff that threatened to halt any more loan payouts to Greece. Instead, she said was open to a voluntary rollover of the country's debt.
The move came as the Greek prime minister reorganized his government, naming a new finance minister to help overcome public resistance and push an austerity package into law.

Τετάρτη 15 Ιουνίου 2011

Μπορούμε να υπερβούμε την κρίση αν είμαστε γρήγοροι και αποτελεσματικοί

Βασικά σημεία συνέντευξης υπουργού Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης και Ανταγωνιστικότητας, κ. Μιχάλη Χρυσοχοϊδη, στο ραδιοφωνικό σταθμό ΣΚΑΪ 100,3 και στο δημοσιογράφο κ. Μπάμπη Παπαδημητρίου  6.6.2011
- Ανέλαβα πρώτη φορά βουλευτής όταν υπήρχαν τα γεγονότα της αστάθειας στο χώρο της πολιτικής, σε μια δύσκολη και πολύ θερμή περίοδο, το 1990, όταν παραπέμφθηκε ο Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου σε δίκη, στα γνωστά εκείνα γεγονότα. Τότε υπήρχαν τεράστια ελλείμματα και θυμάμαι ότι υπήρχε ένα αίσθημα θυμού από την πλευρά των πολιτών. Το συναντούσα μέσα στους δρόμους της Αθήνας που κυκλοφορούσα ως νέος βουλευτής, το οποίο βέβαια στη συνέχεια άλλαξε ριζικά, όταν σιγά – σιγά με την πάροδο του χρόνου, διαπιστώθηκε ότι όλη αυτή η υπόθεση είχε άλλα χαρακτηριστικά. Όμως, και πάλι εκείνο το οποίο χαρακτήρισε και καθόρισε τις εξελίξεις εκείνη την εποχή ήταν η οικονομία.
- Πρέπει να εξετάσουμε γιατί βρεθήκαμε σε αυτή την κατάσταση. Η μεν βραχυπρόθεσμη εξήγηση είναι ότι εφαρμόστηκε μια πολιτική τα τελευταία χρόνια στη χώρα, η οποία οδήγησε σε αδιέξοδο. Η μεσομακροπρόθεσμη εξήγηση έχει να κάνει με τον τρόπο με τον οποίο αναπτύχθηκε και διογκώθηκε ένα κράτος και μια οικονομία και οδήγησε τη μεν οικονομία στον παρασιτισμό, το δε κράτος σε μια πελατειακή λογική. Αυτό ουσιαστικά χτίσαμε μεταπολιτευτικά όλα τα κόμματα, όλη η κοινωνία, με την έννοια ότι ζήσαμε μια ευημερία, υπήρχαν επιτεύγματα, αλλά υπήρχε και μία μαγική εικόνα. Η μαγική εικόνα είχε να κάνει με την πλασματική αυτή ευημερία η οποία δεν είχε σταθερές και υγιείς βάσεις. Το ερώτημα τώρα καταρχάς είναι ποιο είναι το μέλλον, πώς θα πάμε σ’ αυτό, και τι θα υπάρχει σε λίγο στον ορίζοντα.

The euro, its central bank 
and economic governance

Lecture by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB
at the London School of Economics and Political Science
London, 13 June 2011

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honour for me to speak here at the London School of Economics and Political Science today.

The euro and its central bank, the ECB, are unique. The European single currency is the only major currency not issued by a single sovereign state, but by a union of sovereign states.

Indeed, the European Treaties specify a clear division of responsibilities between European-level policy-making and national policy-making. For countries that have adopted the euro as their currency, this implies that, on the one hand, monetary policy is inherently indivisible, and in the euro area it is thus conducted at the supranational level by the ECB. On the other hand, fiscal policies remain largely the competence of national governments.

In this lecture