Η ΙΣΤΟΣΕΛΙΔΑ (ΗΜΕΡΟΛΟΓΙΟ) ΠΟΥ ΠΑΡΑΤΗΡΕΙ, ΚΑΤΑΓΡΑΦΕΙ KAI ΣΧΟΛΙΑΖΕΙ ΣΤΟ ΔΙΑΔΙΚΤΥΟ ΤΙΣ ΚΥΡΙOΤΕΡΕΣ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΕΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑΣ.
Δευτέρα 28 Αυγούστου 2017
ΑΥΓΟΥΣΤΟΣ 2017- Η ΕΙΚΟΝΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑΣ (ΒΑΣΙΚΑ ΜΕΓΕΘΗ)
Το χρεος της Κεντρικης Διοικησης ανηλθε στις 31.3.2017 στα 326.5 δισ. και αυξηθηκε κατα 170 εκ σε σχεση με την 31.12.2016.
Εξαιρετικά μη βιώσιμο το ελληνικό χρέος, αξιολογειται σύμφωνα με το ΔΝΤ.(20/7/2017)
Το ανώτατο οριο παροχής έκτακτης ενίσχυσης σε ρευστότητα (ELA) προς τις ελληνικές τράπεζες μειωθηκε κατα 1,6 δισ ευρω και ανερχεται στα 38,9 δισ. ευρώ έως 3.9.2017
Το ΑΕΠ αυξηθηκε 0,4% το α΄τριμ 2017 σε σχεση με το α΄τριμ 2016 (προσωρινα στοιχεια) εναντι μειωσης 1,1 % του δ΄τριμ. του 2016 σε σχεση με το αντιστοιχο του 2015
Οι Δημοσιες επενδυσεις τον Ιαν-ιουλ 2017 ανηλθαν 1114 εκ εναντι 1705 εκ τον Ιαν-Ιουλ 2016
Το ποσοστό ανεργίας τον Μαιο του 2017 ανηλθε σε 21,7% εναντι 23,6% τον Μαιο του 2016 και 21,7% τον Απριλιο 2017
Oετησιος πληθωρισμος τον Ιουλιο 2017 ανηλθε στο 1,0 % εναντι 1,0% τον Ιουνιο 2017
Το πρωτογενές αποτελεσμα του Κρατικου Προυπολογισμου εμφανισε πλεόνασμα και ανηλθε στα 3,024 εκ. τον Ιαν-Ιουλ του 2017 εναντι πρωτογενους πλεονασματος 2,715 εκ την αντιστοιχη περιοδο του 2016
Το Ισοζυγιο του Κρατικου προυπολογισμου εμφανισε τον Ιαν - Ιουλ 2017 ελλειμμα 1351 εκ εναντι ελλειμματος
1676 εκ την αντιστοιχο περιοδο του 2016
Οι τοκοι τον Ιαν Ιουν 2017 ανηλθαν σε 3533 εκ εναντι 3485 εκ την αντιστοιχο περιοδο του 2016
Οι Δημοσιοι υπαλληλοι ανηλθαν τον Ιουν 2017 στους 689341 εναντι 663077 τον Ιουν του 2016
Οι συνολικες χρηματοδοτικες αναγκες του Κρατικου Προυπολογισμου ανηλθαν τον Ιαν-Ιουλ 2017 σε 708 εκ εναντι 2493 εκ των αντιστοιχων αναγκων για την ιδια περιοδο του 2016
Το ταμειακό αποτέλεσμα (CashFlow) της Κεντρικής Διοίκησης τον Ιαν-Ιουλ 2017 παρουσίασε έλλειμμα 1378 εκ, έναντι ελλείμματος 1807 εκ.τον Ιαν-Ιουλ του 2016
Τα Ταμειακα διαθεσιμα του Ελληνικου Δημοσιου ανηρχοντο στις 31.3.2017 σε 2,9 δισ. εναντι 2,8 στις 31.12.2016
Στο Ισοζ τρεχουσών συναλλαγών το έλλειμμα ανηλθε στα 2,8 δισ τον Ιαν-Ιουν 2017, σχεδον στα ιδια επιπεδα με την ίδια περίοδο του 2016.
Zero Hedge — Austerity is over, proclaimed the IMF this week. And no doubt attributed that to the ‘successful’ period of ‘five years of belt tightening’ a.k.a. ‘gradual fiscal consolidation’ it has, along with its econo-religious ilk, imposed on many of the world’s people.
Only, it’s not true of course. Austerity is not over. You can ask many of those same people about that. It’s certainly not true in Greece.
IMF Says Austerity Is Over
Austerity is over as governments across the rich world increased spending last year and plan to keep their wallets open for the foreseeable future. After five years of belt tightening, the IMF says the era of spending cuts that followed the financial crisis is now at an end. “Advanced economies eased their fiscal stance by one-fifth of 1pc of GDP in 2016, breaking a five-year trend of gradual fiscal consolidation,” said the IMF in its fiscal monitor.
In Greece, the government did not increase spending in 2016. Nor is the country’s era of spending cuts at an end. So did the IMF ‘forget’ about Greece? Or does it not count it as part of the rich world? Greece is a member of the EU, and the EU is absolutely part of the rich world, so that can’t be it.
However this may be, it’s obvious the IMF are not done with Greece yet. And neither are the rest of the Troika. They are still demanding measures that are dead certain to plunge the Greeks much further into their abyss in the future.
An excellent example of this is the Greek primary budget surplus.The Troika has been demanding that it reach 3.5% of GDP for the next number of years (the number changes all the time, 3, 5, 10?). Which is the worst thing it could do, at least for the Greek people and the Greek economy. But not for those who seek to buy Greek assets on the cheap.
But sure enough, the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) jubilantly announced on Friday that the 2016 primary surplus was 4.19% (8 times more than the 0.5% expected). This is bad news for Greeks, though they don’t know it. It is also a condition for receiving the next phase of the current bailout. Here’s what that comes down to: in order to save itself from default/bankruptcy, the country is required to destroy its economy.
And that’s not all: the surplus is a requirement to get a next bailout tranche, and debt relief – but as a reward for achieving that surplus, Greece can now expect to get less debt relief. Because they managed to squeeze another €7.3 billion out of their poor. So they should always be able to do that in every subsequent year.
The government in Athens sees the surplus as a ‘weapon’ that can be used in the never-ending bailout negotiations, but the Troika will simply move the goalposts again; that’s its MO.
A country in a shape as bad as Greece’s needs stimulus, not a budget surplus; a deficit would be much more helpful. You could perhaps demand that the country goes for a 0% deficit, though even that is far from ideal. But never a surplus. Every penny of the surplus should have been spent to make sure the economy doesn’t get even worse.
The €7.369 billion primary surplus, in a country of somewhere between 10 and 11 million people, means some €700 per capita has been taken out of the economy in 2016. Money that could have been used to spend inside that economy, saving jobs, and keeping people fed and sheltered. For a family of 3.5 people that means €200 per month less to spend on necessities which is the only thing most Greeks can spend any money on.
The Troika is not “rebalancing Greece’s public finances in a growth-friendly manner”, as Dijsselbloem put it, it is strangling the economy. And then strangling it some more.
There may have been all sorts of things wrong in Greece, including financially. But that is true to some degree for every country.
And there’s no doubt there was, and still is, a lot of corruption. But that would seem to mean the EU must help fight that corruption, not suffocate the poor.
If you want to do that, taking 4% of GDP out of an economy, and 3.5% annually for years to come, it can only make things worse. And if the Greek economy deteriorates further, how can the country ever repay the debts it supposedly has? Isn’t that a lesson learned from the 1919 Versailles treaty?
The economists at the IMF and the EU/ECB, and the politicians they serve, either don’t understand basic economics, or they have their eyes on some other prize.
In 2012 Eurogroup agreed on a now forgotten deal for cutting Greek debt
The dispute between the IMF and Berlin goes back a few years. But when it comes to defending the German finance minister on the issue of Greek debt relief, it would appear that a lot of what was agreed the German finance minister and Athens has been abandoned or forgotten. That commitment for debt relief was made to different government that the Germans wanted to support without really expecting Athens to ever meet the targets they demanded. Now that their targets have been met, the agreement went out of the window.
Below, an article from Reuters dated Tue Nov 27, 2012
The IMF clinched an agreement on reducing Greece’s debt on Monday [Nov 26 2012] in a breakthrough to release urgently needed loans to keep the near-bankrupt economy afloat.
After 12 hours of talks at their third meeting in as many weeks, Greece’s international lenders agreed on a package of measures to reduce Greek debt by 40 billion euros, cutting it to 124 percent of gross domestic product by 2020.
In a significant new pledge, ministers committed to taking further steps to lower Greece’s debt to “significantly below 110 percent” in 2022 — the most explicit recognition so far that some write-off of loans may be necessary from 2016, the pointwhen Greece is forecast to reach a primary budget surplus.
“When Greece has achieved, or is about to achieve, a primary surplus and fulfilled all of its conditions, we will, if need be, consider further measures for the reduction of the total debt,” German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said.
Eurogroup Chairman Jean-Claude Juncker said ministers would formally approve the release of a major aid installment. Greece will receive up to 43.7 billion euros in stages as it fulfills the conditions. The December installment will comprise 23.8 billion for banks and 10.6 billion in budget assistance.
They also promised to hand back 11 billion euros in profits accruing to their national central banks from European Central Bank purchases of discounted Greek government bonds in the secondary market.
European Central Bank President Mario Draghi said on leaving the talks: “I very much welcome the decisions taken by the ministers of finance. They will certainly reduce the uncertainty and strengthen confidence in Europe and in Greece.”
The Greek Prime Minister at the time Antonis Samaras welcomed the deal.
“Everything went well,” he told reporters outside his mansion at about 3 a.m. in the morning.
“Tomorrow, a new day starts for all Greeks.”
However, the biggest opposition party, Syriza, dismissed the deal and said it fell short of what was needed to make the country’s debt sustainable.
A source familiar with IMF thinking said a loan write-off once Greece has fulfilled its adjustment program would be the simplest way to make its debt viable, but other methods such as forgoing interest payments, or lending at below market rates and extending maturities could all help.
German central bank governor Jens Weidmann has suggested that Greece could “earn” a reduction in debt it owes to euro zone governments in a few years if it diligently implements all the agreed reforms. The European Commission backs that view.
An opinion poll published on Monday [26 Nov 2012] showed the Syriza party with a four-percent lead over the Conservatives who won election in June, adding to uncertainty over the future of reforms.
Why the Yes campaign failed in Greece.
Wolfgang Munchau.
The Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras votes in Athens
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JULY 6, 2015 by: Wolfgang Münchau
It is not that hard to explain why Alexis Tsipras won the referendum by a landslide. It is a lot harder to see what’s going to happen now.
His opponents, both inside Greece and in the European Union went wrong because of serial misjudgments, ranging from the petty to the monumental. For me, three stand out.
The biggest was the clearly concerted intervention by several senior EU politicians, who said that a No vote would lead to Grexit, a Greek exit from the eurozone. One of them was Sigmar Gabriel, the German economics minister and SPD chief. He even doubled up on this threat right after the results came out. The Greeks correctly interpreted these threats as an attempt to interfere in the democratic process of their country. The news last week that eurozone officials tried to suppress the latest debt sustainability analysis of the International Monetary Fund did not help either. The IMF report essentially revealed that the Greek government had been right after all to demand debt relief. The rest of the EU gave the impression that it wanted to rig the referendum, and it did not even bother to conceal this.
The second error of the Yes campaign was a failure to explain how the bailout programme could work economically. This is not a debate between Keynesian and neoclassical economics, the kind that keeps us endlessly busy on these pages. The Greek referendum united economists with very diverse views of how the world works, including Paul Krugman, Jeffrey Sachs and Hans-Werner Sinn. There is no reputable economic theory according to which an economy that has experienced an eight-year-long depression requires a new round of austerity to bring about economic adjustment.
If you have been unemployed for five years, with no prospect of a job, it makes no difference whether the money you do not get is denominated in euros, or in drachma
The third monumental error was arrogance. The Yes supporters thought they had it nailed. Like the British Labour party before the last general election, they had been relying on polls, which turned out to be wildly inaccurate. What I found most galling was the argument that Grexit would bring about an economic catastrophe, as though the catastrophe had not already happened. If you have been unemployed for five years, with no prospect of a job, it makes no difference whether the money you do not get is denominated in euros, or in drachma.
Contempt for democracy and economic illiteracy are not merely tactical errors. Those two “qualities” are now the remaining ideological planks of what is left of the European project. Greece is a reminder that the European monetary union, as it is constructed, is fundamentally unsustainable. This means it will need to be fixed, or it will end at some point.
So what are the options now? I will write about this in greater detail in my next column. But the bottom line is that it is going to be more difficult to achieve a deal now. After the No vote on Sunday, the Greek government will now insist on a very different deal with less austerity. It will insist, and be right to do so, on debt relief that is consistent with the IMF’s latest calculations. I find it hard to see a majority in Germany in favour of such a deal. In fact, I believe the only way to coerce Germany into debt relief talks is to start defaulting. This is not going to happen any other way. At that point, however, the possibility of a Grexit is large.
Perhaps the most realistic solution now would be an agreement that only covers the refinancing of the Greek banking system. The Greek government defaults on its creditors, while the creditors stop paying Greece any new money. That would minimise everyone’s commitment, but such an arrangement, too, is fraught with difficulty.
And finally, it is best not to think of Grexit as a choice the Greek government may, or may not, make. It is not a choice anyone will take. Grexit is what happens when all the other possibilities have been exhausted. There are not many left now.
Τετάρτη 9 Αυγούστου 2017
Τρίτη 8 Αυγούστου 2017
Ν.Χριστοδουλακης : Όσοι ήθελαν το ΔΝΤ είχαν κρυφά σχέδια για Grexit ή πίστευαν ότι θα βγούμε από την κρίση σε έξι μήνες
